





The last decade has been marked by a revival of interest in the
contemporary applicability of traditional international law doctrines
of humanitarian intervention. During the period between the two world
wars, a significant number of state elites adhered to a strict construc-
tion of the theory that under international law each nation is comnletelv
"sovereign" and "independent". Hence, since international law deals so-
lely with external relations between states, and since what occurs within
the state between the "sovereign" and his "subjects" has, by definition,
no effect on external inter-state relations, intervention for humanitarian
purposes by another state on behalf of the "subjects" of a foreign :'so-
vereign" lay outside the scope of international law.1 Under this theory
it was lawful for a foreign state to criticize Hitler's treatuent of Po-
lish Jews, but Hitler's persecution of German Jews was entirely his af-
fair. Writing in 1956, summarizing the experience of the thirties, the
Thomases were able to conclude that
Not even the most revolting violations of the common
laws of decency and humanity committed by a govern-
ment against its own subjects was sufficient grounds
for other states to criticize officially the politi-
cal organization which made such outrages possible.
Humanitarian intervention in the twentieth century,
therefore, retains but little vigor.
2
'See, generallv, Bernard, On the Principle of Non-Interveition 16
(1860); Gareis, Institutions des Volkerrecht 84 (1888); Mannes, "The
.Object Theory of the Individual in International Law," 46 Am. J. Int'l
L. 428 (1952).
2A. Thomas & A. Thomas, Non-Intervention 373-74 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as Thomas & Thomas].
Writing in 1963, Brownlie's conclusion was more categorical: "..
the institution [of humanitarian intervention] has disappeared from
modern state practice."
3
Neglect of the potentiality of traditional humanitarian interven-
tion doctrines was not confined to the theorists of absolute state "so-
vereignty". In their seminal work on Law and Minimum World Public Order,
published in 1961, McDougal and Feliciano alluded to the traditional theo-
ries only in passing, and characterized the doctrines as "amorphous"4 and
"relatively obsolete".5 Yet even the most forgotten of laws have a habit
of re-emerging when there is need for them, and humanitarian arguments
have surfaced most prominently in justification of the American-Belgian
rescue operation in the Congo in 1964, in support of the United States'
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and most recently in fa-
vor of thc. 1971 Indian operation which led to the creation of Bangladesh.
International legal scholars have also argued that legality of interven-
tion to redress violations of human rights in Rhodesia6 and to mitigate
the suffering during the Nigerian civil war. 7 Humanitarian intervention
has also been advanced as an alternative justification for the 1970 South
3 1. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force By States 340
(1963).
4M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 536
(1961).
5 Id. at 90.
6McDougal & Reisman, "Rhodesia and the United Nations; The Lawfulness
of International Concern," 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 12 (1968). Professor
Falk'has also suggested that intervention for "humanitarian considera-
tions" would be lawful in Angola and the Republic of South Africa, Falk,
Historical Tendencies, Modernizing, and Revolutionary Nations, and the
International Legal Order, 8 How. L. J. 128, 150 (1962).
7Reisman, "Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos," Privately
circulated in 1968. Reprinted in Humanitarian Intervention and the Uni-
ted Nations 167 (R. Lillich ed. 197").
Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia aimed at evacuating ethnic
Vietnamese refugees, "in view of the widespread killing of Vietnamese
civilians by Cambodians."8 A spate of scholarly articles 1 9ibut to
appear on the subject, occasioned-no doubt by recent event, lo the In-
dian subcontinent.9
In light of these developments, it should come as no surprise that
the contemporary status of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is
by no means clear. The traditional doctrines were never particularly
well defined, and whatever clarity they may have had was lost through
neglect. Revival of the customary theories during the last ten years
would be better characterized as a contemporary creation of the law,
rather than a historical restoration.
Several features of the current efforts to re-interpret the law
of humanitarian intervention are worth noting in scrie detail. An ex-
cursus into some of the history of the traditional doctrines is manda-
tory, not only to establish that a right of intervention for humani-
tarian purposes existed in customary international law, but also to fa-
cilitate examination of the policy foundations of the traditional law.
Secondly, if a right of humanitarian intervention is to become viable
under present international law, some way of reconciling that right with
the United Nations Charter is a practical necessity. This involves a
doctrinal exercise. Thirdly, the history of the Congo, Dominican Re-
public, and Bangladesh controversies must be studied in order to dis-
cer. what the contemporary international expectations are concerning
the future development of the law and in order to predict the likely
limitations the international community will impose on the use of hu-
manitarian intervention.
II. Delimitation of the Problem: A Contemporary Definition of Humani-
tarian Intervention
Humanitarian intervention might be defined most usefully as the
use of the military instrument by one or more states in the territory
of another state for the purpose of ensuring compliance with a minimum
international standard of human rights.
8 J. N. Moore, Law and the Indo-China War 495, 507-08 (1972).
9 1n addition to Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 7, see, ed.,
Franck & Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Interven-
tion by Military Force," 67 tn. i. Int'l L. 275 (1973); and Fonteyne,
"The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention:
Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter," 4 Calif. W. Int'l L. J.
203 (1974). See also Nanda, "A Critique of the United Nations Inaction
iu the Bangladesh Crisis," 49 Denver L. J. 53, 54 (1972).
This definition is at once more expansive and more restrictive than
traditional definitions. For example, the Thomases define humanitarian
intervention as "the right of one state to exercise international control
over the acts of another in regard to its humanity."i0 The Thomases' de-
flnition contemplates the use of a wide variety of strategies to achieve
humanitarian goals. Certainly states have made use of the diplomatic,
economic, and ideological instruments as well as the military instrument
in their intercessions for humanitarian reasons. The classic method of
intercession was of course the diplomatic protest, and in recent years
the international community has made increasing use of ideological cam-
paigns and economic sanctions in its effort to combat deprivations of
human rights in South Africa and Rhodesia. While even these non-mili-
tary interventions would be condemned under the strictest theory of
state "sovereignty",11 contemporary practice indicates that use of the
non-milltary strategies to protect human1jights is generally accepted
as being lawful under international law.' The real battle among in-
ternational lawyers concerns the lawfnln~qs of the use of the military
instrument to prevent abuse of fundamental human rights. Thus, wnile
it is important to recognize that other strategies may be employed with
great effect to secure recognition of basic human dignity values, this
essay will confine the use of the term "humanitarian intervention" to
mean the right of states to use military force to restore a minimum pub-
lic order ir which human rights receive effective protection.
13
10Thomas & Thomas at 372.
"When the United Nations investigated alleged denials of fundamen-
tal human rights in a particular state, the affected states' leaders in-
variably invoke the principle of "domestic jurisdiction" and contend
that the U.N. action is ultra vires. For an account of early U.N. ex-
periences investigating deprivations in South Africa and the Soviet Union,
see Thomas & Thomas 378-384.
12Thomas & Thomas at 384.
1 3professor Falk agrees that discussion should be confined to si-
tuations in which actual force is used. Otherwise "the subject of in-
tervention becomes so vague that it slips outside the framework within
which legal technique can operate usefully." R. Falk, Legal Order in
a Violent World 160 (1968).
Traditional definitions have also been hampered by their focus on
state "sovereignty". For eyxnmple, Stowell defines humanitarian inter-
vention as "the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of pro-
tecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment which is so ar-
bitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority
within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and Justice."' 4
This definition presupposes that a sovereign is in effective control of
his territory, his government, and his people. In situations of civil
war, however, these presuppositions may be wholly inaccurate. In the
recent Nigerian civil war. for example, General Gowon publicly confessed
that he had no control over his amy in the field. While General Gowon
may not have wished wholesale destruction of the Ibo people, General Ade-
kunle harbored very different views, and he had control over the conduct
of the war in the Eastern Region.15 Many situations involving gross de-
privations of human rights are likely to arise, not when a sovereign is
mistreating his subjects, but rather when there is no elite recognized
as authoritative and controlling, when the public order of a community
has degenerated into violent anarchy. In the Dominican crisis, for ex-
ample, the United States State Department emphasized that the American
action was taken
after the United States had-been officially notified
by Dominican authorities that they were no longer
able to preserve order. The factual circumstances
of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republi-
-can (sic] were such that the landing could not have
been delayed beyond the time it actually took place
without needless sacrifice of lives.... 16
This dimension of humanitarian intervention is of great contemporary
significance. Intervention in situations of violent anarchy need not in-
14E. Stowell, Intervention in International Law 53 (1921).
15H. Reisman, "Letter to the Honorable Richard H. Nixon," Nov. 13,
1968. Parenthetically, General Gowon has recently been given credit for
his role as the principal architect of amnesty and post-war rehabilita-
tion in Nigeria. The Ibos are said to refer to him as "that Christian
soldier who kept the northerners from killing us all." Times, Jan. 29,
1973, at 8.
16U. S. State Dept. Memorandum, "Legal Basis-for U.S. Actions in
the Dominican Republic," 111 C.R. 10734 (daily ed. May 20, 1965Y.
volve "technical violations"'1 7 of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Char-
ter. Intervention in those situations would not be directed at the "ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any state," since estab-
lished governmental structures have collapsed. The Finnish jurist V.
Saario, for example, argues that humanitarian intervention directed against
an authoritative elite in effective control would be banned unless authori-
zed by the Security Council.1 8 But he emphasizes that Article 2(4) would
not apply
then the administration of a State has completely col-
lapsed because of internal unrest and the authorities
have lost control of events. In such circumstances
the State as a subiect of international law has been
temporarily paralysed; it is unable to protect its
citizens, not to speak of aliens sojourning in its
territory, or to carry on its other responsibilities.1 9
Nevertheless, Stowell's definition does emphasize that humanitarian
intervention was historically perceived as an available remedy against a
sovereign who grossly mistreated his subjects. Grotius, for example, ac-
knowledged that ancient "sovereigns" claimed some "special right" over
their subjects, but he also insisted that this right was not without li-
mits:
But if a tyrant . . . practices atrocities towards
his subjects which no just man can approve, the
right of human social connection is not cut off
In such a case. So Constantine took arms against
Maxentius and Licinius; and several of the Roman
emperors took or threatened to take arms against
the Persians if they prevented not the Christians
from being persecuted on account of their religion.2 0
1 7Professor Nanda calls the Bangladesh operation a "technical vio-
lation" of Article 2(4) of the Charter because he doubts the validity
of India's claim of self-defense. It is not clear whether he would also
regard an Indian claim to intervene on humanitarian grounds in the con-
text of the East Pakistani case as a "technical violation" of the Char-
ter. Nanda, supra note 9, at 65.
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Comments by V. Saario on "Report of the International Committee
on Human Rights," at 52 International Law Asoociation, New York Conference,
(1972).
39Id. at 46.
2 0Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk. II, Ch. XXV, Sec. 8 (Mie-
well's tr. 1853).
In other words, no sovereign is above and beyond the domain of law;
wile international law honors state "independence" and "sovereignty",
that "sovereignty" uust be lawfully exercised. If a sovereign abuses
his sovereignty, if he perpetrates crimes against humanity, other states
can lawfully use military force in protection of fundamental human rights.2
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, perhaps the most eminent of post-World War II
jurists who have reasserted the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention,
echoes this "abuse of sovereignty" theme in colorful language. Lauter-
pacht declares that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is not
violated when states exercise forcible self-help "in cases in which a
State maltreats its subjects in a manner which shocks the conscience
of mankind."22
Much of the writing on humanitarian intervention has been influenced
by natural law theory, emphasizing the inalienable rights of man. Na-
tural law theorists regard humanitarian intervention as an implicit "ex-
ception to all rules" of non-intervention set up under25ustomary inter-
national law or even under the United Nations Charter. A comimittee
of experts, assigned by the League of Nations in the 1920's to codify
customary international law, invented a hypothetical contract among
states obligating each of them to guarantee to people within their ter-
ritories the protections of natural law:
Some rights are not rights created by States for the
benefit of their nationals or of foreigners; namely,
the right to life, tha right :o liberty, and the
right to own property. The community has simply re-
cognized the existence of these rights and States
have mutually undertaken to ensure the possibility
of enjoying them. . . . Before these rights, na-
tionality sinks into the background, because they
belong to the man as a human being, and are not, ac-
cordingly, subordinate to the will of the State.
24
21 See Fenwick, International Law 287-88 (4th ed. 1965); 1 Oppenhem,
International Law 312-13 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); Stowell, Interna-
tional Law 349 et.seq. (1931). On the abuse of rights doctrine see Gut-
teridge, "Abuse of Rights," 5 Camb. L. J. 22, 25 (1935).
22H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 32 (1950).
23D. Thapa, "Humanitarian Intervention" (unpublished graduate law
thesis, McGill University, 1968), cited byv Lillich, "Intervention to
.Protect Human Rights," 15 McGill L. J. 205, 211 (1969).
24Report of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee
of Experts fQr the Progressive Codification of International Law on
Under this theory, the state elite which refuses to grant its na-
tionals minimal human rights has breached its contract with other state
elites of the international community. It would certainly be plausible
to argue that humanitarian intervention would be a lawful measure of
self-help available to other state elites to remedy the breach of con-
tract.
But it is not necessary to concoct a fictional contract among the
elites to justify humanitarian intervention. The principal contribution
of the natural law theorists was their insistence on an international
minimum standard of human rights, a minimum standard authorized and L:nin-
tained by international law. As Guggenheim noted in his treatise, pub-
liched after the adoption of the U.N. Charter,
; . . le droit coutumier confere aux autres Etats
le droit de mettre fin a la competence exclusive de
l'Etat qui fait subir a seas nationaux un traitement
Inferieur au standard minimum du droit des gens.
Dans ce cas, une intervention humanitaire serait
justifiee.5
In an earlier work, Borchard also stressed the idea of a minimum
standard. In his view, any particular state elite is limited in its
"sovereignty" by overriding principles of international law; the "do-
mestic Jurisdiction" of any state is conditional rather than absolute:
* . . where a state under exceptional circumstances
disregards certain rights of its own citizens, over
whom it presumably has absolute sovereignty, the
other states of the family of nations are authorized
by international law to intervene on grounds of hu-
manity. When these "human" rights are habitually
violated, one or more states may intervene in the
name of the society of nations and may take such
measures as to substitute at least temporarily, if
not permanently, its own sovereignty for that of
the state thus controlled. 11natever the origin,
"Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territories to Parson
or Property of Foreigners," 20 Am. J. Int'l L., Special Supp. 177, 182
(1926). Emphasis added.
P. Guggenheim, Traite de Droit International Public 289 (1953).
therefore, of the rights of the individual, it
seems assured that these essential rights rest
upon the ultimate sanction of international law,
'and will be protected, in the last resort; by the
most appropriate organ of the international commu-
nity.
Borchard's statement also illustrates another important feature of
the traditional law of humanitarian intervention: the intervening state
could "substitute" its own "sovereignty" fbr the "sovereignty" of the ty-
rant, perhaps not indefinitely, but for a reasonable time. It might be
argued that this "substitution of sovereignty" theory turned himanitarian
intervention doctrine into a cloak for imperialist expansion, but that
was not the understanding of the powers who engaged in humanitarian in-
tercessions. In 1860, alarmed by Turkish misrule in Syria and by the
massacre of thousands of Christians by the Turks, Austria, France, Great
Britain, Prussia, and Russia cnnvened the Conference of Paris, which col-
lectively authorized France to intervene militarily in Syria on behalf
of the Conference. The Paris Protocol was quite explicit in denying any
imperial aims:
les Puissances Contractantes n'entendent
poursuivre ni ne poursuivront dans l'execution
de leurs engagements, aucun avantage territorial,
aucune influence exclusive, ni aucune concession
touchant le commerce de leurs sujets, et qui ne
pourrait atre accorde aux sujets de toutes lea
autres nations.
27
It seems more reasonable to interpret the "substitution" theory not as
a doctrine justifying impeial acquisition, but rather as a realization
that the intervening power will have to have effective control over the
other state's territory during the limited period of occupation. Other-
wise, no humanitarian intervention could be successful.
This does not mean that humanitarian interventions were confined to
rescue operations in time of great crisis. Traditional doctrine and prac-
tice contemplated "th2 fashioning of more permanent structures of social
and political order." 8 In the Syrian case just referred to, for example,
26E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 14 (19-
16). Emphasis added.
2751 Brit. & Foreign State Papers 279. Emphasis added.
28Reioman, supra note 7, at 2.
the Conference of Paris authorized the drafting of a new constitution
for Lebanon, which provided for a Christian governor who would be re-
sponsible to the Porte. 29 Apparently the intervening powers decided
that persecution of the Christians would not be prevented unless govern-
mental structures within the Ottoman Empire were modified. The Syrian
case is extremely important, because even publicists critical38 f humani-
tarian intervention recognize the Syrian operation as lawful.
The Greek intervention of 1830 is even more pertinent, because it
not only resulted in a new constitution or a new governor, but also in
the creation of a new state. Appalled by treatment of the Greeks by the
Ottoman Empire, and at the request of the Greeks, Great Britain, France,
and Russia pledged their support in the London Treaty, for "an arrange-
ment called for, no less by the sentiments of htsaanity, than by interests
for the tranquility of Europe."31 At this point Great Britain, France,
and Russia undertook an armed intervention which ultimately resulted in
Greek independence.33
The recent Indian operation in East Pakistan will be discussed at
.greater length in a later section of this paper. For the moment, how-
ever, it is interesting to note how closely analogous the Bangladesh
case is to the Greek intervention in 1830. Once again intervention re-
sulted in the creation of an independent state. In the Security Council
debates of December 4, 1971, which took place while the Indian military
operation was still in progress, Mr. Sen, the Indian Ambassador, hinted
unmistakably at the creation of a new regime:
2951 Brit. & Foreign State Papers 288-292.
30For example, after reviewing the nineteenth century cases, Brown-
lie argues that "The State practice justifies the conclusion that no
genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred, with the possi-
ble exception of the occupation of Syria in 1860-61." Brownlie, supra
note 3, at 340.
3114 Brit. & Foreign State Papers 633.
32,d. at 1045.
33Reisman, supra note 7, at 19.
India wished to give a very serious warning to the
Security Council that it would not be a party to any
solution that would mean continuation of the oppres-
sion of the East Pakistani people.
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The Bangladesh case may necessitate a rethinking of recent scholarly
attempts to give contemporary content to the customary international law
of humanitarian intervention. In a comprehensive study of a wide variety
of foreign interventions in internal conflict, John Norton Moore has ca-
tegorized humanitarian intervention as one of-a variety of "non-authority-
oriented" interventions, "where objectives are other than the influencing
of authority structures.,3 5 By "authority structures" Professor Moore ap-
parently means the existing governmental structures of foreign states, in-
cluding the current effective elites. Thus he argues that relief for Bia-
fra would only have been lawful "if aimed at avoiding mass starvation ra-
ther than establishing a second state."36 He also hints that the Stanley-
Ville mission would have been unlawful if it had been aimed not only at
rescuing the hostages, but also at "the Gbnye regime."'37
It should be clear that Professor Moore's notion of the permissibi-
lity of humanitarian intervention is quite different from the tradition-
al doctrines. As the Greek and Syrian cases demonstrate, nineteenth cen-
tury theory and practice was strongly "authority-oriented," as was the
Indian intervention in Bangladesh. The "abuse of sovereignty" doctrine
contemplated the replacement of abusive "sovereigns" with "sovereigns"
who would obey the ius cogens of the wider international community. In
this sense any ruling elite is limited in its "authority'"; it must exer-
cise its power in ways which are consistent with a minimum international
standard of human rights. Professor Moore's categorization of humanitarian
-ntervention as "non-authority-oriented" is therefore misleading; the very
essence of the traditional doctrine was-its emphasis on authority, its
insistence on the delineation between permissable and impermissable exer-"
cise of power by state elites over their citizens.
349 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 9 (January 1972).
35Moore, supra note 8, at 118. On this point, see Idem, "The Con-




In fairness to Professor Moore, it must be pointed out that he has
reformulated his theory substantially in light of the Bangladesh experi-
ence. He now recognizes both Pon-auchority-oriented and authority-orien-
ted humanitarian interventions,3 8 and his sole insistence is that the hu-
manitarian intercession have "the minimal effect on authority structures
necessary to protect the threatened [human] rights."39 This latter re-
quirement is probably a restatement of the traditional law on the subject.
One final aspect of this essay's suggested definition of humanitarian'
intervention deserves additional emphasis. The proposed definition links
a state's right to intervene to violations by another state of an inter-
national minimum standard of human rights. Implicit in such a definition
is a notion that the international minimum standard which all governments
owe to their citizens is not a static and unchanging set of rules, but ra-
ther a developing, evolving standard which reflects contemporary expecta-
tions about the scope of protection given to individual human beings in
their exercise of fundamental human rights. Thus, the effort is not on-
ly to set a minimum international standard, a standard which provides more
international protection of basic human rights than was provided wider tra-
ditional international law. The United Nations Charter itself, particu-
larly in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 55, reflects this general objec-
tive. Since the Second World War, beginning with the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in 1948, the world community has striven to increase
both the scope of basic human rights and the means available for their
protection; tnis movement has been increasing in velocity and in power
in recent years.40 In short, the scope of humanitarian intervention
may, in fact, be greater in the latter half of the twentieth century
than it was in the nineteenth, despite the strictures against the use
of force found in Article 2(4) of the Charter: this is because the "con-
science of manking" has been raised to a higher level.
III. A Conflict in Perspectives: The Underlying Policy Debate
Given the depth of contemporary concern for the advancement of hu-
man rights in the world community, it is surprising to learn that many
commentators feel that the ancient doctrines of humanitarian interven-
3 8J. N. Moore, "Toward an Applied Theory for. the Regulation of Inter-
vention" in Law and Civil War in the Modern World (J.N. Moore ed. 1974; in
press, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press), at [MS 26].
391d. at [MS 31].
40
The comst convenient collection of contemporary international pros-
criptions on human rights is Basic Documents on Human Rights (I. Brownlie
ed. 1971).
tion have not survived the United Nations Charter. The opponents of hu-
manitarian intervention have advanced a number of arguments in support
of their position.
The most consistently invoked counter-argument to humanitarian in-
tervention holds that any unilateral national military intervention would
be against the "territorial integrity and political independence" of an-
other sovereign state and hence "in literal violation of Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter."'4  Opponents of the doctrine commonly seek refuge in
Article 2(7) of the Charter, which embodies the principle of "domestic
jurisdiction."4 2 In essence, this argument is nothing more than a vari-
ant of the old, discredited doctrine of absolute state "sovereignty",
under which even the most heinous "domestic" violations of human rights
would escape international review. As noted earlier, some jurists would
carve out an exception "where imediate action is indispensable to save
human life or to avert human sufferings caused by circumstances outside
the control of a responsible Government,"43 but this is little consola-
tion to victims of deliberate brutalities perpetrated by governments in
* effective control. Some authorities refuse to permit even this limited
exception. Professor Henkin states that in civil war "cases such as
Biafra and Bangladesh, where foreign military intervention would help
secession, the uX of force is against the territorial integrity of the
'parent' state," and hence in violation of the Charter.
Professor Henkin's position merits fuller discussion. Professor
Henkin laments the fact that "civil wars are often ethnic wars and there-
fore literally genocidal on both sides."4 5 This, he admits, places in-
ternational lawyers in a terrible dilemma:
But while genocide is illegal [under the Genocide
Convention and perhaps under customary international
.law], civil war is not. That, we must recognize, is
at the heart of our problem. Civil war is not ille-
gal under international law; neither, I must conclude,
41Henkin, "Remarks", 1972 Proceedings, Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 95, 96.
4 2See, for example, the remarks of Agha Shahi of Pakistan in the
Security Council debates of 4 December 1971: "A principle basic to the
maintenance of peace [is] that no political, economic, strategical, so-
cial, or ideological considLrations might be invoked by one State to
justify its interference in the internal affairs of another State..
9 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 7 (January 1972).
4 3Saario, supra note 18, at 46.
44llenkin, supra note 41, at 96. 45b id.
Is the suppression of secession. Despite develop-
ments in the concept of self-determination, it is not
yet accepted, and is not likely to be accepted soon,
that any part of a state has the right to break away,
and that it is unlawful for-the "parent" state to
seek to prevent it, even by force.4 6
Professor Henkin is troubled by this conclusion. Although he recog-
nizes that "in our time civil war, like international war, tends to be
total war," he also makes an eloquent plea "to introduce and establish 47
by law elements of moderation, of proportionality, of humanitarianism."
But he does not offer any satisfactory means of enforcing those limits
on the conduct of operations in a civil war. lie rejects "unilateral
national Intervention" as a means of curbing the excesses of "total" war
and opts for "multilateral intervention" under U.N. auspices as "the most
appeal:ig remedy."48 Yet he is forthright enough to admit that this re-
medy may be illusory, since "usually the international community cannot
act at all, because of the national and international politics that do-
minate each civil war situation."49 The Biafran and Bangladesh cases
tragically reaffirm this pessimistic conclusion; not even the most lurid
and horrible violations of human rights could galvanize international or-
ganizations into action.5 0
46
. Id. at 95.
471d. at 96. Interestingly enough, the Pakistani representative
to the United Nations acknowledged that international law prohibited
certain methods of fighting civil wars; in this sense all war is "li-
mited" rather than "total". Mr. Shahi argued for the principle that a
government in effective control "was entitled to take all rLasonable
and adequate steps [against subversion] to safeguard its existence and
.its institutions." Emphasis added. Mr. Shahi went on to insist that
"Pakistan by no means exceeded that right in suppressing armed and ter-
rorist bands which aimed at dismemberment of the State." 9 U.N. Monthly
Chronicle 6 (January 1972). Mr. Shahi did not mention what remedies
might be available to the international community if world opinion found
the Pakistani Government's reaction to the electoral victory of the Awami
League both unjustified and excessive.
4 8 Itid.
49Id. at 95-97.
50For a critique on United Nations inaction in the Bangladesh crisis,
see _Senerblly, Nanda, supra note 9. Professor Lillich similarly critici-
zes the lack of a United Nations response to the Nigerian civil war. Lil-
lich, nupranote 23, at 216.
In short, if international law is to be capable of introducing and
establishing "elements of moderation, of proportionality, of humanitari-
anism" in the conduct of civil wars, it will have to develop more effec-
tive procedures of enforcement than Professor Henkin proposes.51 If hu-
man rights are to receive even the most miniT-l degree of protection, if
the human rights movement is to be something more than slogans of "posi-
tive morality," it may be necessary to permit individual states to make
the initial "determinatioa of when it is appropriate to embark upon a hu-
manitarian mission . . . subject to review and revision by the world com-
munity."52
Professor Henkin's main fear is that such a decentralized decision-
making process will invariably be subject to abuse:
A humanitarian reason for military intervention is
too easy to fabricate. In fact, often it would not
be a complete fabrication.. . . The United States,
for example, made a few humanitarian noises in 1965
before going into the Dominican Republic. Every case
of intervention I can think of, in fact, was justi-
fied on some kind of humanitaridn grounds, not all
of them wholly false.5
3
There is no doubt that "any procedure that allows a single state,
or a small group of states, to use force without the prior authoriza-
tion of a supranational body is a doctrine productive of possible ab-
use."54 As the Thomases remind us, Hitler justified his acts of ag-
gression against Czechoslovakia on the ground that the alleged perse-
cution of ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland by the Czech government was
a matter of international concern warranting intervention by the Third
5
'Professor Henkin makes a notable plea to "prepare human rights
machinery" which would concentrate on "long-term attempts to anticipate
and prevent ethnic wars." Henkin, supra note 21, at 97. This is, of
course, a laudable suggestion, but it does not offer any guidelines for
handling a crisis situation when efforts to avoid a crisis have failed.
5 \illich, supra note 23, at 217-218.
53Henkin, supra note 41, at 96.
54Lillich, supra note 23, at 217.
Reich.5 5 Pravda justified the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
on quasi-hvmanitarian grounds: the Russians insisted they were "defend-
ing the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people," and alleged that the
Warsaw Pact nations could not be "inactive in the name of an abstractly
understood sovereignty, when they saw that the country stood in peril of
antisocialist degeneration.1156
These celebrated cases of abuse are truly at the heart of the cr-
ticisms levied against proponents of a modern doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. Non-humanitarian or even aggressive motives may lurk be-
hind a humanitarian facade. Because of this potentiality for abuse,
some publicists advocate an across-the-board prohibition of forcible
self-help measures. Thomas M. Franck, for example, argues: "It would
be best, obviously, to have these questions determined by some third-
party process, but if that proves impossible, then, I think, it would
be better to have the law prohibit all interventions. "57 But this so-
called "solution", in the words of Professor Lillich, "constitutes a
classic example of throwing the baby out with the bath water."58 How
many Biafras, how many Bangladeshes must the international community
endure to give effect to this far-from-neutral "principle"? As Pro-
fessor Reisman so eloquently concludes: :We have waited too long and
have already lost our innocence; if we cannot perfect, as a minimum, a
system of humanitarian intervention, we have lost our humanity."59
From a more scholarly and less impassioned perspective, there are
aditional difficulties with the across-the-board, flat prohibition ap-
proach. The first difficulty lies in its misunderstanding of the way
all legal processes, but particular1y the international legal process,
work. International law is not usefully conceived as a body of rules,
55Thomas & Thomas at 374.
5 OPravda Article Justifying Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 7 Int'l
Leg. Mat. 1323, 1324.
5 7Comments by T. M. Franck on "Report of the International Comittee
on Human Rights", 50-51, International Law Association, New York Conference,
1972.
58Lillich, supra note 23, at 217.
59Reisman, supra note 7, at 41.
of flat prohibitions, but rather "as a process of authoritative decision
transcending state lines,"60 an endless process of claims and counter-
claims, a network of reciprocities and retaliations, a system of sanc-
tions involving value deprivations and indulgences. The international
legal process may be viewed as an effort by the participants Jn the pro-
cess to accept those claims which genuinely clarify the common interests
of the entire global community and to reject those claims which plead on-
ly for special interests destructive of the interests of the wider commu-
nity.
At a somewhat lower level of abstraction, it is obvious that such a
conception of international law recognizes that many of the claims put
forward by states and other participants will often be self-serving, some-
times disingenuous, and occasionally downright deceitful. But in a world
In which no one state is able to exercise hegemonial powers, these claims
will ultimately be rejected. in other words, if a state uses the language
of humanitarian intervention to characterize its actions, it must also con-
duct its operations within the limits set by international expectations;
otherwise the humanitarian argument will be exposed as a sham. As McDou-
gal and Feliciano observe in a perceptive passage:
The characterization is, of course, made by an in-
dividual state at its own peril. It partakes, in
other words, of the nature of a provisional deter-
mination in precisely the same way that a claim of
self-defense does, and remains subject both to the
contemporaneous appraisal of other individual states
and to the subsequent review the organized community
may eventually exercise.. . . A policy of permitting
individual initiative is, of course, again like the
policy of allowing self-defense, susceptible to per-
yerting abuse; but this susceptibility is an attri-6 1
bute common to all legal policy, doctrine, or rule.
After several centuries of experience, the international community
has become quite adept at distinguishing the genuine claims from the
spurious. If international lawyers do not possess this skill, they cer-
tainly should be trained in the art--they cannot function without it. It
is not an impossible burden: Hitler's claim that the Czech government
was persecuting Germans in the Sudetenland "was a fiction supported by
6 0 cDougal & Feliciano, supra note 4, at vii.
61Id. at 416.
framed incidents."62 A competent lawyer on learning this could easily
conclude that "the principle under which the Germans claimed to be acting
was applied to the wrong set of facts." 63 The Soviet justification for
the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was even more transparent: in es-
sence the Russians claimed the right of a great power to intervene mili-
tarily in the affairs of an allied country when internal political events
in that country took a path different 'from Communist orthodoxy. In short,
the Brezhnev Doctrine is nothing more than a new name for Russian imperi-
alism; it "amounts to denying in princip 9 the sovereignty of any 'socialist'
country accessible to the Soviet Union."" While the Russians have for
the most part succeeded in crushing Dubeek's "socialism with a human
face", they have not done so without cost. Moscow has been compelled
by international pressure to retreat from the principles of the Brezhnev
Doctrine, and one scholar has even argued that the Doctrine was officially
repealed by the Kremlin during President NLxon's visit to the Soviet Union
in May, 1972.65
In short, a state should be careful to communicate its actual inten-
tions to the world community; its characterization is indeed made "at its
'own peril." Often the would-be intervening state must also take into ac-
count domestic criticisms of its policies: Senator Wavne Morse declared
that the United States State Department Memorandum justifying American
actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965 "would not receive a passing
grade in any law . . . school in the United States."6 6
Secondly, as McDougal and Feliciano pointed out, the policy of per-
mitting individual states to make the initial decision to employ military
coercion is duplicated in many other spheres of the international law
governing the use of force. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves "the
62Thomas & Thomas at 374.
63 Ibid.
64Lowenthal, "The Sparrow in the Cage," 17 Problems of Communism 2,
24 (Nov. - Dec. 1968).
65Schwebel, "The Brezhnev Doctrine Repealed and Peaceful Co-Existence
Enacted," 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 816 (1972).
66111 Cong. Rec. 10734.
inherent right of individual or collective self-defencc if an armed attack
occurs.. . . " The victim state does not have to seek the consent of the
Security Council prior to initiating retaliatory action. This "inherent
right of . . . self-defence" can easily be abused; a truly unscrupulous
state will have little difficulty manipulating the language of self-de-
fence doctrine to suit its own illicit purposes. The Russians justified
their invasion of Czechoslovakia as a necessary measure of self-help, not
merely to defend the "socialist gains" of the Czechoslovaks, but also to
defend the "socialist gains" built up in the Soviet Union and throughout
Eastern Europe:
The weaking of any of the links in the world system
of socialism directly affects all the socialist coun-
tries, which cannot look indifferently upon this....
Czechoslovakia's detachment from the socialist commu-
nity would have come into conflict with its own vital
interests and would have been detrimental to the.other
socialist states.. . .- Discharging their internatiot-
alist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslova-
kia and defending their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R.
and the other socialist states had to act decisively and
they did act against the anti-socialist forces in Czecho-
slovakia.
67
The Kremlin thus employed the language of-"anticipatory self-defense"
as well as the concepts of humanitarian intervention to justify its forci-
ble intervention into Czechoslovak affairs. But Moscow not only abused
traditional legal doctrines in coming up with a justification of its ac-
* tions; the Soviets also indicated that they might abandon the whole of in-
ternational law if it did not serve their interests:
The socialist states respect the democratic norms of in-
ternational law.. . . However, from a Marxist point of
view, the norms of law, including the norms of mutual re-
lations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpre-
ted narrowly, formally, and in isolation from the general
context of class struggle in the modern world.
68
In other words, even a flat prohibition may have little effect in de-
terring a determined aggressor. Since any doctrine is susceptible to per-
verting abuse, it is no answer to criticize humanitarian intervention doc-
6 7 Pravda Article, supra note 56 at 1323.
6 8 Ibid
.
trines on that ground. Much greater abuses will, in fact, take place if
tyrants are assured that they may violate human rights with impunity be-
cause of a strict rule of non-intervention.
A second, related criticism of the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention has as its central thesis the fact that states usually intervene
for a mixturd of motives, not all of them humanitarian. Professor Henkin
warns us that "it is not possible in civil wars to isolate and act only
upon genocide and other human rights violations;" 69 the intervention in-
variably takes on "political" overtones. Dr. Brownlie contends that hu-
manitarian arguments surface frequently as "a subsidiary justification
for an intervention which is an expression of purely national policy."
In other words, even if a state has genuine humanitarian motives, its ac-
tions may be tainted by the ambitions of power politics, efforts to gain
ground in the Cold War, or other "selfish motives". 71 The Pakistani ar-
gument before the United Nations Security Council during the debates over
Bangladesh relied heavily on the "ulterior motive" hypothesis to condemn
the Indian invasion. Agha Shahi, the Pakistani representative, declared
that
India found in Pakistan's internal crisis a potent
means for the execution of its designs. Those de-
signs were perhaps best started by an Indian poli-
tical publicist, Mr. S. Swamy, who wrote in .other-
land, New Delhi, on 15 June: "The break-up of Pa-
kistsn is not only in our external security interests
but also in our internal security interests. India
should emerge as a super-Power internationally and
we have to nationally integrate our citizens for
this role. For this the dismemberment of Pakistan
is an essential pre-condition."
72
Naturally, there was a grain of truth in Mr. Shahi's assertions; the'
emergence of Bangladesh removed Pakistan as a significant influence in
69Renkin, supra note 41, at 96.
70Brownlie, supra note 3, at 339.
7 3Brownlie finds "selfish motives" in most of the celebrated cases of
humanitarian intervention of the nineteenth century. Id. at 339-340.
729 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 7 (Jan. 1972). Mr. Shahi's selection of
the remarks of an Indian political columnist serves as an effective tool
Southeast Asian affairs. This certainly simplified India's security
problems. India's motives were, of course, not entirely unselfish. Bo-
gen has argued, somewhat naively, that "where the decision to intervene
falls to a single state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that
the state be totally disinterested.,,73 This requirement would doom all
but the most theoretical instances of humanitarian intervention. As Bo-
gen himself later recognizes, unless a state has some definite interest,
"no single governmt is willing to expend the money and manpower neces-
sary for action."7 Biafra is tragic proof of that statement.
As Professor Henkin noted, the political reality is too complex to
present the world with an "ideal type" of humanitarian intervention in
which the intervening state had no other interests. Critics will al-
ways be able to assert that any humanitarian operations is, in reality,
only a "pretext"'75 disguising the "real" intentions of the intervening
states. Yet just because there is always a mixture of motives underly-
ing any decision to intervene does not mean that disengaged observers
committed to human dignity values will be paralyzed in their attempts
to evaluate a particular claim to intervene for humanitarian purposes.
The predominant purpose of the intervention will surface soon enough,
and the intervening state will be aware that its actions will be under
intense scrutiny by the international community. Any time a state re-
sorts to the use of force for any purpose its actions are evaluated in
terms of the goals being sought: these goals may be selfish or more in-
clusive, asserted on behalf of special, parochial interests or on behalf
of debate, but a rather obvious one. It would not be difficult to dis-
cover some Indian publicist somewhere who would opine that the dismem-
berment of Pakistan was a cardinal foreign policy goal; Indians have
been arguing this since the Partition.
73Bogen, "The Law of Humanitarian Intervention: United States Po-
licy in Cuba (1898) and in the Dominican Republic (1965)," 7 Harv. Int'l
V. J. 296, 311 (1966).
74 Id. at 313.
75 Howard Weisburg points out that the use of the word "pretext" by
protesting states tacitly constitutes a recognition that the subject mat-
ter of humanitarian intervention is indeed legitimate. In other words,
if the operation were not a pretext, it would, in fact, be legal. Weis-
burg predicts that the assailants of a particular operation "would tolerate
the use of force in the protection of human rights in a more factually
neutral case." "The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian
Intervention", 12 Va. J. Int'l L. 261, 269-270 (1972).
of special, parochial interests or on behalf of the entire world commu-
nity. Humanitarian inter entions have been classified as failing with-
in this latter category;7  certainly "the use of armed force in defense
of human rights is as emphatically in the common interest as is the
maintenance of international peace and security."77
If the Indian operation in Bangladesh is upheld as a legitimate ex-
ercise of the right of hunmanitarian intervention, this will mean that
the presence of other and more selfish otives behind the Indian action
did not ultimately taint the operation as unlawful. This would place
contemporary humanitarian intervention doctrine fairly close to 59e con-
cepts that prevailed in the nineteenth century. Both proponents and
opponents79 of humanitarian intervention agree that the celebrated nine-
teenth century interventions were actuated by a variety of motives, some
of them wholly selfish. Stowell summarized the nineteenth century ex-
perience in a sentence that might be taken to reflect the current sta-
tus of humanitarian intervention after Bangladesh: "Desirable as it is
that humanitarian intervention should De, whenever possible, both dis-
interested and collective, this cannot be made a condition for the jus-
tification of the action taken." 80
A good case can be made for the proposition that the world commu-
nity has indeed accepted the Indian operation in Bangladesh as legiti-
mate, despite India's selfish interest in seeing the dismemberment of
the Pakistani state. To be sure, the General Assembly overwhelmingly
supported a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal
of troops on December 7, 1971, durirg the heat of fighting, and this
might be regarded as a moral victory for Pakistan.81 The Soviet Union
76McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 4, at 17-18.
77Reisman, supra note 7, at 16.
78Stowell, supra note 14, at 64.
79Brownlie, supra note 3, at 339-340.
80Stowell, supra note 14, at 63-64.
81The vote was 104 in favor, 11 opposed, with 10 abstentions. 9
U.N. Monthly Chronicle 89, 91 (Jan. 1972). Mr. Bhutto certainly re-
garded this vote as pro-Pakistani. Id. at 30.
was forced to use its veto to defeat a similar ceasefire resolution Dro-
posed in the Security Council by the United States on December 13.02' But
it soon became clear that the people of Bangladesh were welcoming the In-
dian Army as their liberator, not as an aggressor, and within a few short
days the Pakistani forces were compelled to surrender. World opinion was
changing, too; on December 15 the head of the Pakistani delegation, Mr.
Bhutto, walked out of the United Nations after delivering an emotional83
speech blaming thte world community for condoning Indian "aggressions.
India was not condemned, nor even censored, by an U.N. organ, for its
forcible intervention; despite the landslide vote in the General Assem-
bly for an immediate ceasefire, the "member nations seemed reconciled
to India's use of force."84  The Pakistani forces were soon compelleg_
to surrender, and Mrs. Gandhi proclaimed a ceasefire on December 17.
In the succeeding months evidence accumulated supporting the propo-
sition that the world community had indeed recognized the Indian inter-
vention as lawful. During the debates in August 1972 over the admission
of Bangladesh to the United Nations, the Washington ehaie d'affairs of
the People's Republic of Bangladesh noted in a letter to the President
of the Security Council that over 85 countries, including four permanent
Members of the Security Council, had accorded full diplomatic recogni-
tion to the new Rahman government, and that Bangladesh had already been
admitted to full membership in several international organizations of
the U.N. "family".86 Bangladesh's application for membership was de-
feated only by the Chinese veto.87
82The vote was ii in favor, 2 opposed, with 2 abstentions. Id.
at 34.
8 3Id. at 37.
8 4Nanda, supra note 7, at 66.
859 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 41 (Jan. 1972).
869 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 24 (Aug.-Sept. 1972).
8 7The vote was 11 in favor; 1 opposed, with 3 abstentions. Id.
at 30. Two of the abstaining delegates explained their votes as ex-
pressions of the view that the question of admission should be post-
poned until the issue of the repatriation of the 90,000 Pakistani pri-
soners of war had been resolved. Id. at 27-28.
Ultimately, therefore, the world community may be said to have ap-
proved the Indian operation in Bangladesh. Iudla no doubt had selfish
motives, but it was also acting in the common interest in stopping the
slaughter of the people of East Bengal. In the end the world community
agreed with the Indian delegate who said "it was not India that sought
to dismember Pakistan. It was the oppressive regime of West Pakistan
which had dismembered Pakistan by its actions."o3
To recapitulate: humanitarian intervention doctrines can indeed
be abused, and even where humanitarian motives are genuine, a state may
intervene for a variety of other motives, some of them purely selfish.
Yet neither of these problems compels the conclusion that humanitarian
intervention ought to be proscribed entirely. Amy legal system, any
legal doctrine, is subject to abuse; it is always necessary to distin-
guish the genuine claims from the spurious. Secondly, a state's corollary
non-humanitarian motives may be disregarded if the intervention as a
whole is genuinely in defense of the common interest in remedying gross
violations of human rights and if the operation is conducted within li-
mits set by the world community.
Other criticisms of the doctrine are not nearly so substantial.
Dr. Brownlie complains that "the institution did not conspicuously en-
hance state relations and was applied only against weak states. It be-
longs to an era of unequal relations." 89 Dr. Brownlie's focus is en-
tirely on the stability of inter-statp relations. No emphasis is pla-
ced on protections to be accorded individual human beings; they are to
be treated as so much cannon fodder in a Machiavellian game of power
politics. Dr. Brownlie's argument can be attacked on his own ground,
however; clearly state relations are not enhanced if elites in effec-
tive control are authorized, under misguided principles of absolute
non-intervention, to commit brutal violations of human rights. This
point will be developed at greater length in the next section of this
essay, but for the moment one need only recall the tragic history of
the rise and fall of Hitler's Third Reich. In the words of John Humphrey:
"The Second World War and the events leading up to it was the catalyst
that produced the revolutionary developments in the international law
of human rights that characterize the middle twentieth century
It was as no other war had ever been a war to vindicate human rights.
889 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 34 (Jan. 1972). (Remarks of Mr. Sadar
Swaram Singh.)
89Brownlie, supra note 3, at 340-341.
90
"The International Law of Numan Rights in the Middle Twentieth
Century" in M. Bos (ed.), The Present State of International Law and
Other Essays 75,'82-83 (1973).
In short, deprivations of human rights can threaten international peace
and security and thus end ilp by destroying the amicable state relations
Dr. Broumlie wishes to preserve.
Dr. Brownlie's second point is that the interventions were under-
taken only against weak states. If the Second World War is perceived
as in part a humanitarian effort, this contention is simply wrong. A-
part from this, the main problem lies in the fact that the "era of un-
equal relations"9 1 is still with us; no one would invade the Soviet Union
to redress the rights of Soviet Jews; the risk of nuclear war is prohi-
.bitive. An implicit cost/benefit analysis occurs in every decision to
use force. Nuclear war would mean the destruction of all basic values;
the principle of proportionality requires that the world community con-
fine its protests against the treatment of Soviet Jews to non-military
sanctions. Just because it is difficult to move against the Soviet Union
for its deprivations of nunan rights does not mean, however, that E-nall
states should be able to persecute ethnic or racial groups with impuni-
ty. This would elevate the fiction of "sovereign equality" into even
more of a shibboleth.
One other policy reason against humanitarian intervention is com-
monly invoked: "the consideration that outside interference, far from
improving the position of victims of persecution, may, by drawing upon
them the wrath of their governments, achieve the contrary result."
9 2
Generally, this argument is invoked when non-military interventions are
being proposed, as in the economic sanctions against Rhodesia or South
Africa. The argument has a superficial theoretical appeal, but, as
Lauterpacht points out, "must be regarded as contrary to experience.
The fury of persecution receives an impetus not only from foreign acqui-
escence, but also from the hesitation and reserve of foreign intercession
91In a footnote Dr. Brownlie cites nineteenth century authorities
who "considered that humanitarian intervention applied only to 'semi-
civilized states' which did not have full international status." (At
341.) Stowell, however, rejected this distinction: ". . . when . . .
a civilized state transgresses the dictates of humanity, it also may
be constrained to reform its conduct." Stowell, supra note 14, at 65,
citing authority to similar effect. In other words, both "civilized"
and "semi-civilized" states were equally subject to humanitarian inter-
vention; there was no "era of unequal relations". Moreover, a state
perpetrating these kinds of abuses could scarcely be called "civilized";
the distinction is totally meaningless.
92
Lauterpacht, supra note 22 at 32.
coupled with courteous admission that there is no right of intercession."
93
In other words, it is the doctrine of non-intervention that is counter-
productive, not the doctrine of humanitarian intercession.
IV. The Article 2(4) Problem: Reconciliation of Humanitarian Interven-
tion with the United Nations Charter
The chief doctrinal problem faced by both proponents and opponents
of the theory of humanitarian intervention arises from its omission from
the text of the Charter. Dr. Brownlie admits that "humanitarian inter-
vention has not been expressly condemned by either the Laague Covenant,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the United Nations Charter"94; any prohibi-
tion or allowance of humanitarian intervention must be read in by impli-
cation.
Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue that the "general pro-
hibition of resort to force"95 found in Article 2(4) of the Charter co-
vers humanitarian intervention as well. If the framers of the Charter
"had wished to exclude humanitarian interventions from these prohibi-
tions they would have done so expressly."96 The argument of the pro-
93Id. at 32-33. Sir Hersch cites instancei where the British govhrn-
ment abstained from protecting its own Jewish nationals from the perse-
cutions of Czarist Russia and Nazi Germany!
94Brownlie, supra note 3 at 342. This is a significant concession.
The next step in the argument justifying humanitarian intervention would
be to invoke the principle of the Lotus case that any state is authorized
to take any action which is not specifically prohibited by a rule of in-
ternational law. Case of the S. S. "Lotus", [1972] P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No.
10. This approach is correctly rejected by Nanda as "rigid and doctri-
naire and . . . unrelated to the context of a situation", but it is of-
ten useful in debate. Nanda, "The United States' Action in the 1965 'no-
minican Crisis: Impact on World Order--Part I", 43 Denver L. J. 439,
478 (1966).
95Bro.nlie, supra note 3-, at 342.
A. Thomas & A. Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965 (1967)
at 22, describing the Latin American position. [Hereiafter cited as
Thomas & Thomas, Dominican Republic.] This bit of treaty construction
Is not overly persuasive: one could just as easily insist that the fra-
mers explicitly state what uses of force they were prohibiting. This is
in line with the philosophy of the Lotus case, supra note 94.
ponents is a bit more sophisticated. Professors McDougal97 and Reisman
have taken the lead in developin' a doctrinal justificativa, of humani-
tarian intervention, and their argunlents deserve recapitulation in some
detail.
Professor Reisman maintains that a "close reading of [Article 2(4)]
will indicate that the prohibition is not against the use of coercion per
se, but rather the use of force for specified unlawful purposes." 9 8 The
text is worth quoting in full:
All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.
97McDougal's position has undergone significant change since he
wrote his comprehensive treatise on Law and :Iinimum World Public Order
with Feliciano. As he explains: "I'm ashamed to confess that athone
time I lent my support to the suggestion that Article 2(4) and the re-
late& articles did preclude the use of self-help less than self-defense.
On re lection, I think that this was a very grave mistake, that Article
2(4) id Article 51 must be interpreted differently . . .. In the ab-
sence .f collective machinery to protect against attack and deprivation,
I would suggest that the principle of major purposes requires an inter-
pretation which would honor self-help against prior unlawfulness. The
.principle of subsequent conduct certainly confirms this. Many states
of the world have used force in situations short of the requirements
of self-defense to protect their national interests." McDougal, "Au-
thority to Use Force on the High Seas," 20 Naval War College Rev. 19,
28-29 (No. 5, 1967). McDougal's earlier position echoed the conclusion
taken by the Thomases: "The general international law right of an in-
dividual nation or group of nations to intervene for humanitarian pur-
poses remains unchanged, except that this intervention may no longer be
taken by means involving the use or threat of force." Thomas & Thomas
at 384. (Emphasis added.) Tfhis conclusion led the Thomases to comment
ironically that "from a practical point of view it would seem that the
Charter encumbers rather than advances . . . human right and fundamen-
tal freedoms . . .." (Id. at 312.) Such a pessimistic outcome should
have led the Thomases to reappraise their earlier conclusion. The prin-
ciple that humanitarian intervention can only be undertaken in self-de-
fense has persisted, but many jdrists invoking this theme take a broad
view of self-defense. See Comments by S. Sharma on "Report of the In-
ternational Committee on Human Rights," International Law Association,
New York Conference, 1972, 47-48, 52-53.
9 8Reisman, supra note 7, at 16.
Professor Reisman then goes on and states that "Since a humanitari-
an intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to
the political independence of the state involved and is . . . in con-
formity with the most fundamental peremptroy norms of the Charter, it
is distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4)." 9 9 Some
critics have found a "literal violation"'0 0 of the Charter in India's
intervention in East Pakistan, which resulted in a territorial change
and the dismemberment of Pakistan. The problem with this literalist view
is that the words "territorial integrity" and "political independence"
provide no magical touchstone fcr appraisal of Indian policy. Those
terms of art certainly are neither self-defining nor self-explanatory;
to put content into them requires more searching inquiry.
Traditional international law did not make "territorial integrity"
or "political independence" an absolute rule, subject to no qualifica-
tions or exceptions. Indeed, the "abuse of sovereignty" doctrine ex-
pressly held that "territorial integrity" and "political independence"
had to be exercised in accordance with the expectations of the world
community, within the limits set by international law. It is unrea-
sonable to assume that the draftsmen of the Charter, fresh with the ex-
perience of the Second World War, a war fought "to vindicate human rights,"1 0 1
would have disregarded that experience to enact an absolute rule of non-
interventlion which would allow a new Hitler to persecute humanity at
his pleasure. It is much more reasonable to assume that they preserved
the "abuse of sovereignty" rule and its underlying policy, especially
after evidence of the most shocking kind of "abuses of sovereignty" be-
gan to accumulate from Auschwitz, Dazhau, and Buchenwald.
The conceptual reconciliation of the doctrines of humanitarian in-
tervention with the language of Article 2(4) can be distilled into the
following syllogism:
1. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force
against the "territorial integrity" or "political
independence" of any state.
2. Any state must exercise its "territorial integrity"
and "political independence" within limits set by
international law; if a ruling elite perpetrates
9 9 
Ibid.
100Lenkin, supa note 41 at 96.
10 lhtmphrey, supra note 90 at 83.
crimes against humanity or otherwise engages
in conduct which shocks the conscience of man-
kind, it has exceeded those limits.
3. Intervention for humanitarian purposes is not un-
dertaker. against the "territorial integrity" or
"political independence" of another stare, but only
against the excessive and abusive conduct of the
offending government. International law does not
permit brutalitids to be comunitted under the pro-
tective cloak of "territorial integrity" and "po-
litical independence".
4. Hence, humanitarian intervention is not inconsis-
tent with the strictures against the use of force
contemplated by Article 2(4) but instead "repre-
sents a vindication of international law",102 a
practical means of enforcing the purposes of the
Charter to promote and protect human rights in
the world community.
In a sense, proponents of humanitarian intervention have met their
burden of persuasion at this point, since they have shown that humani-
tarian intervention is not literally inconsistent with Article 2(4).
Since Article 2(4) did not change the customary international law on the
use of forceful self-help for humanitarian purposes, and since "the doc-
trine appears to have been so clearly established under customary inter-
national law that only its limits and not its existence is subject to de-
bate,"1 03 there is no further need to engage in additional justifications.
Yet support for a modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention can
be found in other portions of the Charter; arguments in favor of humani-
tarian intervention can be derived from the Charter itself, not merely
in spite of the prohibitions of Article 2(4). As Professor Reisman
writes:
In terms of its substantive marrow, the Charter strength-
ened and extended humanitarian intervention, in that it
confirmed the homocentric character of incernational law
102Reisman, supra note 7 at 16.
103Lillich, supra note 23, at 210.
and set in motion a continuous authoritative pro-
cess of articulating international human rights;
reporting and deciding infractions; assessing the
degree of aggregate realization of human rights;
and appraising its own work.
I 04
The Preamble of the Charter expresses the determination of the peo-
ples of the United Nations "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth'of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and womeL. . . " Significantly, a later paragraph of the Preamble ex-
presses a commitment "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest.. . . " The juxtaposition of these commitments in the
Preamble compels the conclusion that "the use of force in the common in-
terest, such as for self-defense or humanitarian purposes, continues to
be lawful."1 05 The Charter draftsmen therefore reaffirmed not only their
faith in fundamental human rights, but also their approval of the custo-
mary remedies of human rights enforcement, including humanitarian inter-
vention. Otherwise, the lofty preambular statements of the Charter be-
come an empty piety.
Article 1(2) of the Charter specifies the major purposes of the Uni-
ted Nations and expressly links "the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples" with the strengthening of "universal peace."
Article 1(3) declares that "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms"
are "international problems". Significantly, Article i(i) also affirms
that the primary mission of the United Nations is "to maintain interna-
tional peace and security" through "effective collective measures for
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.... ,106 Article
55 of the Charter articulates even more clearly the "intimate nexus be-
tween human rights and minimum world order":1 07
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
104Reisman, supra note 7 at 7.
1051.d. at 8.
1 06Emphasis added.
107McDougal & Reismain, supra note 6 at 12.
a. higher standards of living, full employ-
ment, and conditions of economic and so-
cial progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, so-
cial, health, and related problems; and
international cultural and educational
cooperations; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.108
Article 56 transforms these commitments of the United Nations Or-
ganization into an active obligation of each individual Member to take
all appropriate actions in defense of human rights:
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and sena-
rate action in cooperation with the Organization for
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55.109
Articles 55 and 56 may properly be read to include an implicit right
of humanitarian intervention, particularly when gross violations of human
rights threaten international peace and security. The nexus between in-
ternational peace and security and the most fundamental human rights has
been perceived by many jurists. The late Judge Lauterpacht perhaps put
it best when he wrote that:
The correlation between peace and observance of fun-
damental human rights is now a generally recognized
fact. The circumstance that the legal duty to re-
spect fundamental human rights has become part and
parcel of the new international system upon which




10Lauterpacht, supra note 6, at 13.
Yet would not humanitarian intervention in itself constitute a breach
of the peace? Judge Lauterpacht also explained away that seeming para-
dox:
In the eyes of governments there was often deemed to
exist a conflict between the defence of human rights
through external intervention and the considerations
of international peace threatened by such interven-
tion. That conflict was, in the long run, more ap-
parent than real. For, ultimately, peace is more en-
dangered by tyrannical contemot for human rights than
by attempts to assert, throu-ii intervention, the san-
ctity of human personality.11 1i
Moreover, a "threat to the peace" is already in existence whenever
any elite embarks on a policy of genocide or other inhuman behavior. De-
privations of this sort, even if they occur only within the territorial
bounds of a single state, are ineluctably a matter of grave international
boncern:
It has been too often confirmed that practices of in-
dignity and strife which begin as internal in physi-
cal manifestation in a single community quickly and
easily spread to other communities and become inter-
national.11 2
In an intensely interdependent world, where communications are near-
ly instantaneous and practically universal, deprivations of human rights
necessarily have international impacts. If a ruling elite is able to
perpetrate atrocities with impunity, other elites will be tempted to throw
off their restraints. Perhaps, if the world community had reacted with
vigor to the mass starvation of the Ibo population in Nigeria, the Pakis-
tani government would not have attempted to suppress the Awami League
with such brutality. Humanitarian intervention is necessary not only
to remedy current and immediate violations of human rights, but also to
serve as a deterrent to future deprivations.ll3
llId. at 32. (Emphasis added.)
1l2McDougal & Reisman, supra note 6, at 13.
113Nearly every decision has effects stretching beyond its ime-
diate outcome. A trend can develop a remarkable momentum in a very
short time. Professor Moore cites as examples the wave of fasci;t re-
gimes that came to power shortly before World War II and the moru re-
In short, the institution of humanitarian intervention is necessary
if "threats to the peace" are to be squelched in time. :.rticles 55 ind
56 explicitly authorize and require separate as well as joint action in
defense of human rights as a means of removing threats to international
peace and security. As Professor Reisman concludes:
. . . the cumulative effect of the Charter in regard
to the customary institution of humanitarian inter-
vention is to create a coordinate responsibility for
the activeprotection of Human rights: members may
act jointly with the Organization in what might be
termed a new organized, explicitly statutory, humani-
tarian intervention or singly or collectively in the
customary or international common law humanitarian
intervention. In the contemporary world there is
no other way the most fundamental purposes of the
Charter in relation to human rights can be made ef-
fective.
1 1 4
There would seem to be little argument that the United Nations it-
self could authorize international humanitarian operations involving the
use of military force.1 1 5 The Charter itself provides abundant proof
that human rights are not "within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"
under Article 2(7), 1 1 6 and "insofar as human rights deprivations giving
cent trend toward decolonization. Decisions regarding intervention in
.contexts other than humanitarian also have significant long-run effects.
Moore, supra note 8 at 152-153.
1 4 Reisman, supra note 7 at 13.'
115Henkin, supra note 41, at 96.
1 1 6 McDougal and Reisman sum up the history of the "domestic juris-
diction" clause in the following passage: "The concept of domestic juris-
diction in international law has never been impermeable. Actions occur-
ring within the territorial bounds of one state with palpable deprivatory
effects upon others have always been subject to claim and decision on the
international plane. There has scarcely ever been a case of major propor-
tions In which the principle of doizestic jurisdiction has not been invoked;
when transnational effects have been precipitated, the principle has rarely
barred effective accommodations in accord with inclusive interest. Hence,
domestic jurisdiction means little more than a general community concession
cause for humanitarian intervention constitute a "threat to the peace"
or "breach of the peace" or "act of aggression", the Security Council,
under Chapter VII of the Charter, is seized with a mandatory jurisdic-
tion.",11 7 Article 2(7) expressly provides that the principle of domes-
tic jurisdiction "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII." If the Security Council "has demonstra-
ted either incapacity or unwillingness to act, the secondary powers of
the General Assembly, confirmed by the Uniting for Peace Resolution,
come into operation. ll3
Of course, as a matter of policy, it would be desirable for most
humanitarian interventions to be undertakan under formal international
auspices.119 In the i.meidate post-war era, some scholars expressed
the hope that United Nations procedures would prove sufficient to pro-
tect human rights. Especially if the Security Council could function
as planned, there would be little need for an individual right of bu-
manitarian intervention under Articles 55 and 56. Thus, Judge Jessup
wrote in 1948:
The landing of armed forces of one state in another
state is a "breach of the peace" or "threat to the
peace" even though under traditional international
law it is a lawful act. It is a measure of forcible
self-help, legalized by international law because
there has been no international organization compe-
tent to act in an emergency. The organizational de-
fect has now been at least partially remedied through
the adoption of the Charter, and a modernized law of
nations should insist that the collective measures
envisaged by Article I of the Charter shall supplant
of primary, but not exclusive, competence over matters arising and in-
timately concerned with aspects of the internal public order of states.
Where such acts precipitate major inclusive deprivations, jurisdiction
is internationalized and inclusive concern and measures become perihis-
sable." McDougal & Reisman, supra note 6 at 15.
117Reisman, supra note 7, at 12, citing Articles 24 and 39 of the
U.N. Charter.
118 Id. at 33, citing Articles 25 and 2(6) of the Charter.
11 9 Professor Nanda defines a "better world order" as "world in
which unilateral coercion across state lines gives way to collective
action undertaken only by international organizations." Nanda, note
the individual measures approved by traditional inter-
national law.1 20
Of course, the tragic history of the Cold War has frustrated this
idealistic hope. The expectations of the founders of the Charter have
been frustrated by the lack of Great Power unanimity in the Security
Council, and ideological differences have similarly on occasion paralyzed
the General Assembly. Hence, an individual right of humanitarian inter-
vention, which is authorized under Articles 55 and 56, remains even more
essential as a functional substitute for formal international action.
Judge Jessup recognized the cogency of these precepts when he wrote:
It would seem that the only possible argument against
the substitution of collective measures under the Se-
curity Council for individual measures by a single
state would be the inability of the international or-
ganization to act with the speed requisite to preserve
life. It may take some time before the Security Coun-
cil, with its Military Staff Committee, and the pledged
national contingents are in a state of readiness to act
in such cases, but the Charter contemplates that inter-
national action shall be timely as well as powerful.121
In practical application, all of the post-Charter instances of hu-
manitarian intervention have been undertaken only after a failure of the
United Nations to take appropriate action. Professor Lillich in his re-
view of the Belgian-American operation in the Congo in 1964 concludes
that "the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity were un-
able to cope with a situation which required immediate action . . . if
ever there was a case for the use of forcible self-help to protect lives,
the Congo rescue operation was it."'1
22
94, supra at 442. A "Better" world order is not the one we have, how-
ever, and if international organizations are unable to cope with major
international problems, some form of individual self-help is a practi-
cal necessity.
120. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 169-170 (1948).
121Id. at 170-171.
122Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights,"
53 Iowa L. Rev. 325, 340 (1967).
The American intervention in the Dominican Republic is more compli-
cated factually, in that United States forces rcmained for a considerable
period after American and foreign nationals had been removed. This gave
rise to the criticism that "The United States intervened forcibly in the
Dominican Republic . . . not primarily to save Aerican lives, as was then
contended but . . . primarily on the fear of 'another Cuba' in Santo Do-
mingo."l 3 The United States was also assailed on the ground that the
United States had not consulted with the OAS members beforehand. In the
words of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, the United States
"confronted them with a fait accompli, convening the Council of Ministers
only after landing its troops in the Dominican Republic."'124 Despite
these formidable challenges to the American action, no critic "[denied]
that on the evening of April 28 [when the U.S. intervention began], San-
to Domingo was in the throes of internal conflict, that the public order
had already been disrupted, and that hundreds of foreign nationals felt
unsafe and wanted to leave the country.1'1 25
In justifying the American omission of consultation with OAS mem-
bers, the Johnson Administration stressed the need for immediate action.
President Johnson declared that the American interventioa was not preci-
pitate: "Some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their
beads cut off, and six Latin American enbassies were violated and fired
upon over a period of 4 days before we went in." 26 Undersecretary Mann
emphatically affirmed this point: "We did not consider it necessary to
wait until (more?] innocent civilians had been killed in order to prove
to the most skeptical that lives were in danger. Had we done this we
should have been derelict in our duty to our citizens."
'12 7
Reasonable men may differ over the issue of consultation in the Do-
minican case.12 8 In response to the Johnson Administration's argument
that time was of the essence, Representative Ogden Reid said:
123111 Cong. Rec. at 23002. (Remarks of Senator Fulbright.)
1242 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 4 (June 1965).
125Nanda, supra note 94 at 464-465.
126 53 Dept. State Bull. 19, 20 (1.965).
127Id. at 734.
12 8Nanda, supra note 94, at 467-468 summarizcs the main arguments
on both sides.
I am not persuaded, that it was not possible to take
5 minutes, 15 minute-,, a half-hour, or even an hour
to have consulted with the OAS, and at least have in-
formed them at the highest level of our thinking and
to consult with them with regard to the decision .. 12
In an interdependent world, patterns of consultation and cooperation are
essential in all areas of human activity.1 30 For the moment, however, it
is significant to note that critics of the Johnson policy in the Domini-
can Republic did not base their criticisms wholly or even predominately
upon the failure of the Administration to consult the OAS. Notwithstand-
ing this omission, Seiiacor Clark considered the initial Armerican action
valid "on humanitarian grounds."'131 Senator Morse approved the initial
landing of troops as valid, not only on rioral and humanitarian grounds,
but also under international law.132 Senator Fulbright agreed that a
small force intervening for the "express purpose of removing U.S. citi-
zens and other foreigners from the island" was justifiable.133 If such
a force were promptly withdrawn after it had completed its mission, Ful-
bright said that no "fair-minded observer at home or abroad would have
considered the United States to have exceeded its rights and responsibi-
lities," and "the incident would soon have been forgotten."
134
1291Il Cong. Rec. 24094 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
130The modern international monetary system is a good example. For
a trenchant criticism of American "abrupt unilateral action" during the
*'monetary explosion of August 15, 1971," see E.-Rostow, Peace i. the Ba-
lance, 336-337 (1972).
131111 Cong. Rec. 23369 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
132Id. at 26183.
133Id. at 23001.
1 3 4 Ibid.
Iii summary, even the most severe critics of the operation in the
Dominican Republic recognize that some form of hnumanitarian int-rven-
tion can be lawful. Although critics decried the failure of the John-
son Administration to consult w4th the OAS, apparently they conceded the
point that decisions of this sort often have to be made promptly to be
effective. Certainly the United Nations had neithec the means nor the
will to react to the Dominican crisis. In summary, "the Dominican Re-
public case, whatever conclusions are drawn about the total operation,
confirms the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention and indicates with
even greater precision than does the Congolese case the conditions and
limitations of humanitarian intervention.
'
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The Bangladesh case is a much better case for demonstrating the to-
tal paralysis of the United Nations and the concomitant need for some
form of individual self-help. The world for months had received reports
of "atrocities unparalleled in history."1 36 Yet the world community did
next to nothing, just as it had done next to nothing to mitigate the hor-
rors of the Nigerian civil war. In the Security Council debate of De-
cember 12, 1971, the Indian delegate summed up the situation with a fair
degree of accuracy:
It was not India which declared or started war; it was
not India which was responsible for creating the con-
ditions that led to the present unfortunate conflict;
it was not India which deliberately and systematically
refused to meet the aspirations of the 75 million peo-
ple inhabiting the country, once part of Pakistan; it
was not India which perpetuated the repression, geno-
cide, and-brutality which provided the springboard for
the freedom movement of Bangla Desh, which led to the
decision of the people of that region to create a free
and independent nation; it was not India which forsook
the long period of nine months during which a reasonable
political settlement could have been evolved with the
leaders and people of Bangle Desh.
The United Nations had been unable to deal with the
root cause of the problem in East Bengal. Informal
consultations in the Security Council in July and Au-
gust indicated that the international community could
not, due to limitations born of its commitments to
135
. Reisman, supra note 7, at 29.
13N. Y. Times, May 30, 1971, at 5:1, quoting the description of
Justice A. S. Chowdhury, Vice Chancellor of the University of Dacca and
the Pakistani member of the U.N. Human Rights Conission.
the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, act In the
matter. In the face of a direct violation of the
Universal Declaration of Hun:in Rights and the pro-
visions of Articles 53 and 36 of the Charter by Pa-
kistan, the Security Council and the United Nations
should have found themselves in a position to inter-
vene and persuade Pakistan to return to reason. That
did not happen. While developments proceeded on their
inexorable course towards the present tragedy, the
United Nations continued to be inhibited by considera-
tions of domestic jurisdiction.1 37
The Indian delegate's reference to Article 2(7) was, in a sense,
ironic, especially considering the number of resolutions and the amount
of effort that has been devoted to demonstrating that human rights vio--
lations in South Africa and Rhodesia were -atters of international con-
cern. Clearly, if there was ever a case where human rights deprivations
had palpable transnational effects, Bangladesh was it: an estimated 10
million refugees bad fled to India, and thousands more were fleeing from
the wrath of the Pakistani army each day.13 8 Despite this tremendous
impact on India's economic and political infrastructure, Secretary Gen-
eral Thant, in his September Annual Report, said that in his exchanges
with the governments of India and Pakistan, he had been "acutely aware
of the dual responsibility of the Unitad Nations, including the Secre-
tary-General, under the Charter both to observe the provision of Arti-
cle 2, paragraph 7, and to work, within the framework of international
economic and social co-operation, to help promote and ensure human well-
being and humanitarian principles. "139 This conception of a "dual re-
sponsibility" paralyzed both the Secretary-General and the U i!ted Na-
tions.
The Secretary-General's construction of Article 2(7) is plainly
at variance with its express language. Article 2(7) declares that the
1379 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 29 (Jan. 1972). (Remarks of Mr. Sar-
dar Swaram Singh.)
138Nanda, supra note 7 at 66.
1398 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 130 (Oct. 1971).
principle of domestic jurisdiction "shall not prejudice the application
oi enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Enforcement measures were
in order, since it was abundantly clear that Pakistani brutality not
only constituted an immediate "breach of the peace" but also imminently
threatened international peace and security on a much wider scale. This
is not merely the wisdom of hindsight; everyone knew that events in East
Bengal were approaching crisis proportions. Yet the Secretary-General
"did not use the authority granted him under Article 99 to bring the
matter before the Security Council for discussion, nor did he ask the
General Assembly to meet in an emergency session since the Council was
unwilling to meet."1 4 0 The Secretary-General's inaction can rightly
be described as an abdication of professional responsibility.
In summary, the United Nations failed to take any effective mea-
sures in response to massive atrocities in East Pakistan; it failed to
head off the crisis by persuading the parties to arrive at a political
settlement; and it ultimately failed to prevent the war. Surely the In-
dian operation Lust be considered a legitimate measure of self-help be-
cause of, in Judge Jessup's words, "the inability of the international
organization to act with the speed requisite to preserve life.
'1 4 1
Some recapitulation of the main points of this section is in order.
The doctrine of hmnanitarian intervention is not inconsistent with the
general prohibition of the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the Char-
ter, since humanitarian intercessions are not directed at the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state but are only aimed at re-
medying gross affronts to human dignity.14 2 The words "territorial in-
tegrity", "political independence", and "domestic jurisdiction" do not
provide a talismanic shield behind which barbaric ruling elites can per-
petrate atrocities with impunity.
140Nanda, supra note 9 at 63-64.
141Jessup, supra note 120, at 170-171.
14"
4With regard to Bangladesh or, m.ore generally, on claims for self-
determination, note that the principle of self-determination in the form
of territorial disintegration is a complementary opposite to principles
of territorial integrity and continuity of state organization or politi-
cal independence. India's humanitarian intervention which contribuLed to
Pakistan's territorial disintegration must be assessed in terms of its
aggregate consequences upon all values in reference to community poli-
cies. "The principle of 'territorial integrity' is no more absolute or
sacred than the principle of 'domestic jurisdiction'. Both principles
must fall before our overriding concern for human dignity." E. Suzuki,
Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Group
Formation 187 (Unpublished J.S.D. Thesis, Yale University Law School, 1974).
Furthermore, the Unit-d Nations Charter itself proclaims an "inti-
mate nexus between human rights and minimum world order,"14 3 particular-
ly in the Preamble and in Articles 1 and 55. Article 56 obligates mem-
ber states to take both joint aud separal.e action in defense of human
rights and thus includes an implicit right of humanitarian intervention,
particularly when gross violations of human rights threaten international
peace and security. In short, the right of humanitarian intervention is
entirely consistent with the major purposes of the Charter1 4 4 and, indeed,
constitutes a vindication of international law.
Finally, although the United Nations posses the power to authorize
and conduct humanitarian operations, the history of the post-war period
indicates that international organizations have been paralyzed in their
attempts to cope with humanitarian crises. The Security Council in par-
ticular has not developed into the kind of effective, plenary body the
framers of the Charter anticipated. Unfortunately, in the contemporary
world, it is simply no answer to suggest that all humanitarian inter-
ventions be undertaken under formal international auspices. in the first
place, the draftsmen of the Charter preserved an individual right of hu-
manitarian intervention under Article 56. Secondly, post-war state prac-
tice demonstrates that prior Security Council approval is not a require-
ment for humanitarian intervention under international law. Lastly, and
most importantly, if an individual right of humanitarian intervention is
not preserved, human rights will be lacking in effective protection.
1 4 3McDougal & Reisman, supra note 6 at 12.
1 4 4 professor Franck dissents from this view, arguing rather bizar-
rely that "Hunanitarian intervention has, in practice, become a legal
concept which, whether or not it violates the provisions of Article 2(4)
and 2(7) of the Charter (as I beliere it does), dertainlv violates the
public policy which underlies the Charter and its provision for eguality,
independence, and self-determination of States." Cited by R. Quadri in
Report of the International Comnittee on Human Rights, International Law
Association, New York Conference 1972 at 45. Emphasis added. It is a
weird kind of policy that enables all states to practice genocide with
"equality" and with total "independence" from international action. "Self-
determination", for Professor Franck, apparently means that Karachi can
ruthlessly impose its will on the people of East Bengal, even if it has
to slaughter them to make thew realize their "self". If these are the
p:xblic policies behind the Charter, we need a new United Nations. Of
course, they are not the policies of the Charter, and all we need is a
less preposterous interpretation. Professor Franck recently reiterated
his view in Franck & Rodley, supra note 9.
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V. Criteria for an Accentable Humanitarian Intervention: The Require-
ments of Contemporarv Internacional La:
As noted above, "humanitarian intervention is an extraordinary re-
medy, an exception to the postulates of state sovereignty, and territori-
al integrity which are fundamental to the traditional theory, if not the
actual practice of international law."'145 Humanitarian intervention
should thus be considered only as a last resort; the intervening state
must show that it has exhausted all available remedies. Humanitarian
interventions will be measured, as are all uses of force by states, by
the twin requirements of necessity and proportionality.
In order to assess the requirements of necessity and proportionality
in a particular case, it is absolutely essential to employ a detailed con-
textual analysis of the situation giving rise to the claim to intervene
for humanitarian purposes. There is no escape from this difficult and
often lengthy task; no doctrinal formula can make appraisal of the par-
ticular claim any easier.
The celebrated cases of humanitarian intervention, both before and
after the adoption of the United Nations Charter, display a wide variety
of partiripants, a significant diversity of perspectives, and a multi-
formity of strategies and modalities. While there has been no unique
pattern, there have been some uniformities in practice: "A trend study
indicates that choice of modality depended cn the nature, intensity,
and location of the humanitarian threat, the capacities of the inter-
vening power, and-heprojection of the intervenor as to the most effi-
cacious and economic means of securing humanitarian succor."146 Rele-
vant contextual inquiry should focus on the following features of the
social process:
A. Situations
What is the extent of human rights violations in the affected area?
Are the deprivations complained of isolated incidents, or do they fit in-
to a pattern of systematic governmental persecution? The Thomases argue
that "governmental participation is a material element of a crime against
humanity, for only when official organs of sovereignty participate in
145Reisman, supra note 7 at 2.
146 Id. at 18-19.
atrocities and persecutions do crimes assume international proportions."'
14 7
This is too narrow a view. In a civil war situation in which the generally
recognized government has lost effective control, major deprivations can
occur which certainly "assume international proportions". Indeed, as
earlier noted, some jurists consider this to be the only situation giving
rise to a lawful claim of humanitarian intervencion.148 The Congolese
and Dominican cases repudiate the Thomases' notion that "official parti-
cipation" in the deprivations is a prerequisite to lawful intervention.
Nevertheless, in situations short of the anarchy of civil war, it is
likely that governmental participation in the persecutions or atrocities
will be relatively easy to detect. In any event, the deprivations must
be of such a magnitude to justify resort to the use of force. In the con-
,text of a "typical" struggle for power among competing factions, Professor
Farer cautions against interventioh on behalf of any faction because of
the uncertainties involved in determining "the net potential gain in human
rights: "149
Even if we could predict the length of the conflict
and the number of wounds and fatalities it would
cause, with what could they be compared? Certainly
not only with the human cost of the inequity or'in-
eptitude which preceded the revolt, for we would al-
so have to take into account the uncertain political
and social consequence of either a successful or un-
successful rebellion. The calculus is imponderable,
obviously, not only at the beginning of conflict, but
also during its course.
1 50
In the "atypical" context of "an immediate threat of genocide or
other widespread arbitrary deprivation of human life in violation of in-
ternational law," however, Professor Farer regards unilateral interven-
tion as permissible.151 Apparently when a crisis has reached these pro-
1 47Thomas & Thomas, at 374.
148 See text accompanying supra note 18.
14 9Farer, "On Professor Moore's Synthesis ia Moore (ed.), supra
note 38, at [MS. 8].
150Ibid.
il d. at [MS. 26].
portions there is less need to agonize over a decision to employ military
force, because inaction and delay will probably result in grcater loss of
human life than the efficacious use of force. Indeed, as military opera-
tions go, humanitarian interventions have been remarkably successful in
carrying out their mission with the minimum loss of human life. in some
instances this success is attributable to the overwhelming military su-
periority of the intervening forces. In the Bangladesh case, however,
the antagonists were more evenly matched; India's quick victory is at-
tributable at least in-part to the inability of the Karachi government
to rely on the fidelity and support of the population of East Bengal. A
government which perpetrates crimes against humanity suffers not only from
a weak moral position, but from a poor strategic one.
Since humanitarian intervention is an "extraordinary remedy," the vio-
lations of human rights which give rise to it must also be extraordinary.
Any decision to use force must take into consideration "the terrible la-
cerations of human rights occasioned by armed conflict." 152 Yet, in a
proper case, it would appear that humanitarian operations can be under-
taken with the minimal loss of life. Although no use of force is per-
fectly predictable in all it. consequences, the consequences of non-in-
tervention may be both foreseeable and appalling.153 .
B. Participants
Article 56 of the U.N. Charter implicitly authorizes a unilateral
right of humanitarian intervention. Some critics "distinguish sharply"
between multilateral intervention and unilateral national intervention,
contending that only multilateral action undertaken under Security Coun-
cil approval is lawful.154 This view both misreads the Charter and is
1 52Id. at [MS. 8].
153Ii the Congolese case, for example, the rebel leader, Christophe
Gbenye, clearly signalled his intentions: "We will make our fetishes
with the hearts of the Americans and Belgians, and we will dress our-
selves with the skins of The Americans and Belgians." 52 Dept. State
Bull. 18 (1965). This was not an idle threat. One evacuee reported that
he had witnessed a number of executions of native Congolese in which "the
most illustrious of those killed had their hearts cut out and eaten in
public by the rebels." (The Times, London,, Nov. 25, 1964, at 12:2.
154Quadri, supra note 144, at 45.
unsound in policy. Especially in crisis situations where the need for
an immediate response is evident, unilateral national action may be the
only effective means of preventing loss of life. All that is required
is that the unilateral action be taken in accordance with the common in-
terest, with the inclusive interests of all humanity.
This is not, of course, to argue against multinational participa-
tion in humanitarian operations. Wide participation itself is the stron -
est evidence that genuine common interests are being defended. Most
preferable would be action taken within the frame of authoritative in-
ternational organizations. The organization could intervene directly
or could delegate humanitarian missions to its members. If United NIa-
tions does act, however, there is strong argument that its competence
'should be exclusive.
1 55
If U.N. or regional action is not pessible, collective intervention
is preferable to intervention by a single state, again for obvious poli-
cy reasons. Collective action by states with differing social systems,
with different racial or cultural backgrounds, would also be an impres-
sive display of action manifestly taken in the common interest.
"Where circumstances require a unilateral humanitarian intervention,
the operation should be submitted to inclusive authoritative appraisal
as soon as possible."1l5 6 Certainly all such operations should be promptly
reported to the Security Council. It is advisable to "internationalize"
a unilateral humanitarian intercession as soon as possible. A week af-
ter the initial American military landing in the Dominican Republic,
for example, the OAS authorized the creation of an Inter-American Peace
Force which replaced certain United States contingents with forces from
seven Latin American nations.1 5 7
Participation by local forces of the state where the humanitarian
Intervention is taking place raises more complicated problems. In a
civil war situation there is considerable international pressure to avoid
155Jessup, supra note 120 at 170-171.
1 5 6Reisman, supra note 7 at 30-31.
15 7Thomas & Thomas, Dominican Republic at 37-3.
taking sides in the conflict. 158  In a rebellion situation, on the other
hand, claims are often made to intervene on behalf of the "cor.stitution-
al government," enabling it to enforce "its municipal statutes relating
to rebellion."15 9 The boundary line between rebellion and civil war has
never been a very satisfactory one, and some writers1 60 deny the legality
of assisting an existing government against an insurgency. The question
of neutrality when one side or another is perpetrating atrocities may
well turn out to be a false one, however. in any event, participation
in the operation by one of the struggling factions would not add much
to the inclusivity of patticipation and may raise troublesome questions
about the underlying purposes of the intervention.
C. Perspectives
1. Objectives of the Intervenor
As noted earlier, the most persistent criticism of humanitarian
intervention doctrine emphasizes the multitude of selfish reasons which
lead states to intervene and the potentiality of abuse that is inherent
in allowing states to make unilaterally the initial decislon to inter-
vene. Humanitorian intervention "may be a disguise for the advancement
of nationalistic or ideological coercive designs . . .. "161 It is mis-
leading to suggest, however, that doctrines of unilateral self-help allow
an intervening state to become "judge and jury in its own case."162 Any
decision to employ force is subject to the contemporaneous appraibal of
the world community, and "later review by a higher authority such as
the Security Council, the General Assembly, or the Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs can either affirm or deny the le-
gality of the original decision .... "163
158For a listing of the varying doctrines, see Brownlie, supra note
3at 323-327. For a simplistic emotional statement on the inadmissability
of all armed intervention, see G.A. Res 2131(305). (Reprinted in 60 Am. J.
Int'l L. 662 [1966].)
.159MeDougal & Feliciano, supra note 4 at 535.
1601 C. Hyde, International Law (2nd rev. ed.), 182, 253; G. Lawrence,
Principles of International Law 131-132 (7th ed. 1930).






If abuse of humanitarian intervention is to be minimized, detailed
appraisal of the perspectives and objectives of the intezvening state
is a practicai necessity. The main problem is to distinguish the genu-
ine claims from the spurious. "It is of particular importance that la-
tent (or disguised) objecties be disting:ished from naaifeEc (proclaimed)
objectives." 1 6 4 It is the intervening state acting on behalf of the com-
mon interest of the whole community in. halting atrocities, or are the hu-
manitarian arguments merely window dressing to cover up special interests
destructive of the cormon interest?
The world community has been alert to the potentiality of abuse and
has subjected each claim to intervene for humanitarian purposes to intense
scrutiny. In the U.N. debates over Bangladesh, for example, the Indian
delegate was compelled, under close questioning about the motives of the
Indian action, to declare that "The entry of India's armed forces into
Bangla Desh was not motivated by any intention of territorial aggrandize-
ment.. .. India had a clear and formal understanding with the Govern-
ment of Bangla Desh that the armed forces of India would remain in Bangla
Desh territory only so long as the people and Government required and wel-
comed their presence."1 65
Similar questions and answers about the intervenor's intentions have
been raised and responded to in every case involving humanitarian claims.
In the Dominican Republic crisis, Secretary of State Rusk admitted that
the primary motive for the American intervention had switched from the
purely humanitarian objective of saving lives to a different purpose--
the prevention of a Communist take-over of the country:
What began in the Dominican Republic as a democratic
revolution was taken over by Communist conspirators
who had been trained for and had carefully planned
that operation. Had they succeeded in establishing
a government, the Communist seizure of power would,
in all likelihood, have been irreversible, thus
frustrating the declared principles of the OAS. We
acted to preserve the freedom of choice of the Domi-
nican peuple until the OAS could take charge and in-
sure that its principles were carried out.f66
1 64 McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, "Human Rights and World Public Order:
A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry," 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 237, 242 (1969).
1659 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 28, 29 (Jan. 1972). (Remarks of Mr. Sar-
dar Swaram Singh.)
166Statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk of May 8, 3.965, on com-
munist subversion, The Dominican Crisis, Dept. State Pub. 7971, Inter-
American Series 92 (1965).
This shift in objectives is also evidenced by changes in the Amer-
can military deployment. On April 28, the President ordered the landing
of 400 Marines on Dominican soil; this probably would have been sufficient
force to carry out a rescue mission for American and other foreign na-
tionals. The next day, however, President Johnson made the decision to
reinforce the additional contingent, and ultimatcly the United States
troop build-up surpassed 20,000 Marines.1 67 This latter decision was
interpreted by the world community as reflecting the determination of
the United States to prevent "another Cuba" in the Caribbean. Critics
of the intervention distinguish sharply the legality of the initial land-
ing from the~subsequent build-up. In the view of the Thomases:
That United States action which had been predicated
on protection of human life was not subject to extreme
criticism, but vehement protest was registered at what
was called an arrogant assumption by the United States
of power to intervene unilaterally in an internal re-
volutionary situation in a nation of the Western Hlemi-
spherc when the United States unilaterally determined
that a dangerous degree of communist participation was
involved.168
In summary, both the perspectives and the actions of the intervening
state will be closely insepcted to determine the legality of the particu-
lar claim. As Professor Reisman notes, "The Dominican Republic case,
whatever conclusions are drawn about the total operation, confirms the
lawfulness of humanitarian intervention and indicates with even greater
precision than does the Congolese case the conditions and limitations of
humanitarian intervention."1 69
2. Perspectives of the Intervenee
Publicists in the field of humanitarian intervention have devoted
little systematic attention to the perspectives of the relevant domes-
tic participants in the state subjected to humanitarian operations.
Much of the literature has focused on the problem of obtaining the "con-
sent" of the generally recognized government to humanitarian operations
within its territory. A number of situations can be envisaged, each one
conceivably requiring different policies.
16 7Thomas & Thomas, Dominican Republic at 7.
16 81d. at 24. Emphasis added.
169Reisman, supra note 7 at 29.
Humanitarian intervention originally grew up out of the "abuse of
sovereignty" doctrine under which any state could intervene against a
sovereign who treated his subjects in such a way as to shock the con-
science of mankind. To impose a requirement of consent in this situa-
tion would emasculate the remedy: no tyrant would willingly give his
consent to operations that would end his tyranny. If there is a re-
quirement for an invitation to intervene in such a case, Vattel indi-
cated that the oppressed people had the right to issue an invitation
to foreign powers:
Si le prince,.attaquant les lois fondamentales, donne
son peuple tin l~gitime sujet de lui resister, si la
tyrannie, devenue insupportable, soullve la Nation,
toute.puissance 'tranLre est en droit de secourir un
peuple opprime, qui lui demands son assistance.1 7
0
An invitation from the victims of oppression would be easily ob-
tainable; indeed, one could imply an invitation from the victims in such
a situation.
In cases short of an "intentional malfeasance on the part of the State
in which the act occurred," Professor Franck would require the intervening
state to seek permission from the government of the affected state.1 71
This requirement would apply to situations of rebellion and civil war,
the only difference being that "a State intervening on the side of the
government (in a civil war situation] is really engaging in an act of
war against a belligerent, and the laws of war apply, including the right
-of the other side to receive similar aid from its foreign friends."1 72
This seems to open up the possibility for multiple interventions. many
of them not of a humanitarian character, and subsumes the distinctive
character of a humanitarian intervention into the more general law re-
garding aid to particular factions in situations of civil strife. Pro-
fessor Franck admits that his categorization gives rise "to important
questions of fact-perception which are not readily resolvabi.e.173
170E. Vattel, 2 Droit des Gens 56 (T. Pomroy ed. la05).
'
71Franck, supra note 57, at 50.
1721bid.
173Ibid.
Arguably a state undertaking a humanitarian inztervention should
dissociate itself as much as possible from support of any p'rticular
group engaged in the domestic struggle for power; its primary goals
are to preserve human life and to prevent atrocities, not to influ-
ence the outcome of the internal political process. Of course, neu-
trality is impossible if one of the contending factions is committed
to a policy of genocide, but this comes closer to the case of "inten-
tional malfeasance" noted earlier.
Professor Franck's concern with consent is understandable; a re-
quirement of consent may reduce the potentialities of abuse inherent
In a doctrine of self-help. Professor Franck cites the 1964 Stanley-
ville rescue as an instance "when the government of a sovereign State,
having committed no malfeasance of its own but being unable to protect
aliens from danger, will call upon a friendly ally to help. '1 74 Of
course, permission of the host goverm!ent may be perceived as taking the
entire operation out of the category of forcible self-help, since the
intervention at the request of a foreign state is not then technically
a derogation from "sovereignty" . Although one State Department offi-
cial argued in this vein in justifying the Congo operation,1 75 Profes-
sor Lillich comes closer to the mark when he says that "the United States
treated the Congolese invitation as just another factor permitting it
to participate in an hmtanitarian intervention, rather than as the sine
qua non of such intervention's legitimacy."1 76
Even if the intervening state is required to seek the consent of
the recognized government for any humanitarian operations talken in the
course of rebellion or civil war, this would not eliminate the possi-
bility of abuse of humanitarian intervention doctrines. Consent it-'
self is readily manipulable. Considerable doubt has been raised about
the authenticity of the request by the Dominican Nilitary Junta for the
United States armed forces in the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic.
The official view of the United States is that the call came from the
"military officials then exercising such authority as there was in the
Dominican Republic," that they could not guarantee protection of Ameri-
1741bid
.
175 Cleveland, "The Evolution of Rising Responsibility," 52 Dept.
State Bull. 7, 9 (1965).
1 7 6 Lillich, supra note 122 at 340.
can citizens and other foreign nntionals.177 The United States did not
recognize the Junta and did not "intervene . . . on the side of the an-
tirebel forces . . . to put down the revolt, as the United States was
requested to do on April 28 by the antirebel military junta."1 73
This view was seriously challenged by congressional critics who
argued that the American Ambassador had solicited the invitation from
Colonel Benoit, who headed the military junta. In the words of Sena-
tor Clark:
At thelnsisfence of the CIA-I believe it can be docu-
mented--a new junta headed by a certain Colonel Benoit
had been formed, although it was pretty well confined
to the San Isidro air base. That junta sent word to
Ambassador Bennett, "You had better send American
troops in because a Communist takeover threatens."
Ambassador Bennett sent word back, "I can't get away
with bringing Americans in on that ground because the
evidence is not clear. If you will change your request
and make it in writing, and ask American forces to in-
tervene in order to protect American lives, then I be-
lieve that we can persuade Washington to do it."
So Benoit changed his position and put it on the ba-
.sis of protecting American lives. Bennett forwarded
that post haste to the State Department and to the White
House, and troops were sent in.
179
Other authorities claim that Ambassador Bennett "visibly sponsored
the creation of the Junta."180 Obviously, a solicited request from a
17752 Dept. State Bull. 913, 915 (1965). (Reprint of Ambassador
Stevenson's statement in the Security Council.)
17853 Dept. State Bull. 62 (1965>.
179111 Cong. Rec. 23366 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965). For similar
effect see id. at 23001 (remarks of Senator Fulbright, Sept. 15, 1965)
and at 26185 (remarks of Senator Morse, Oct. 15, 1965).
180T. Szulc, Dominican Diary 53 (1965).
sponsored "government" would cast doubt on the integrity of the consent.
Professor Nanda notes that the Johnson Administration made & effort to
deny Senator Clark's version of what happened and declares that "the Uni-
ted States' decision to send troops could be justified on Ambassador Ben-
nett's appraisal of the situation and not merely on the request from the
military Junta .. , "181 In other words, as in the Congo, the United
States treated the invitation from the Junta "as just another factor per-
mitting it to participate in an humanitarian intervention rather than
as the sine qua non of such intervention's legitimacy."
18 2
In retrospect, it would seem that the United States would have been
better advised not to seek the consent of any faction in the Dominican
struggle. In many situations, consent can become a formalized ritual,
covering up the genuine issues. The Soviet Union obtained the consent
of the ousted Hungarian Communist puppet government to put down the Nagy
revolt of 1956, but this did not conceal the Soviet act of aggression.
183
In the Dominican case the effort to obtAin a formal consent implicated
the United States more deeply with one of the competing rivals and thus
cast doubt on the validity of the underlying humanitarian motives of the
operation. Although the United States officially refused to recognize
the Junta as the legitimate Dominican government, there is no doubt that
the Benoit faction was helped by American recognition of its authority
to requisition foreign assistance. For these reasons, a r equirement of
consent, far from reducing the possibilities of abuse of humanitarian
doctrines, seems to increase the possibility that the humanitarian in-
tervention is to be justified in a particular instance, it ought to be
justified on the basis of necessity and proportionality, not on the ba-
sis of a technical requirement of coisent.
D. Strategies
Nowhere are the requirements of necessity and proportionality more
apparent than in the choice of the relevant strategy. Considerations
181Nanda, supra note 94 at 466-467.
1 8 2 Lillich, supra note 122 at 340.
1 8 3 For realistic criteria on when "internal conflict has reached a
level which requires a freeze on military assistance to a recognized
government," see Moore, supra note 8 at 201.
of strategy have been discusse d at some length throughout this paper,
but they deserve some brief recapitulation. For obvious reasons, the
world community has tended to prefer low coercion to high coercion stra-
tegies. Initially, an intervening state is required to exhaust all
available remedies before cmharking on a unilateral hnanitarian opera-
tion. Us of the diplomatic, economic, and ideological instruments should
be considered as an alternative to the use of the military instrument,
since they are typically regarded as less coercive. If humanitarian
objectives can be attained by alternative means, use of the military
instrument would not meet the test of necessity. A state would simi-
larly be required to demonstrate that organized international action
is unavailable and ineffective before intervening on its own accord.
Use of the military instrument is also more justified when the violation
of human rights is irmminent and immediate, because under those condi-
tions it is likely that there is no other recourse.
Considerations of proportionality require that the minimal amount
of force necessary to protect human rights be employed. The relative
power positions of the intervenor and intervenee states must be taken
into account; no one would think of mounting a humanitarian military
operation against the Soviet Union for its treatment of the Jewish mi-
nority. Humanitarian intervention in such cases constitutes a hazard
to the very persons whom it is designed to protect, to say nothing of
the probability of igniting the entire globe in a nuclear holocaust.
State practice has also indicated that humanitarian operations be
limited not.only in their use of coercive measures but also in the du-
ration of the mission. A half-hearted intervention may be wor3e than
no intervention at all, for it could prolong the conflict and increase
the agony. The use of force must be quick and effective if it is to be
proportional. The Congo operation is a case par excellence of compli-
ance with this principle. As soon as the rescue was accomplished, the
troops were withdrawn at the request of the Congolese government, a de-
mand "readily acquiesced in by the United States. '1 8 4 The Congolese
ease merits comparison with the American action in the Dominican Repub-
lic. Professor Lillich concludes that "while the initial landing of
fLve hundred Marines meets the proportionality test, it is hard to jus-
tify the subsequent build-up to over 20,000 men, much less their pro- '18
longed presence in the country, on traditional forcible self-help grounds.
Indeed, official explanations of the legal basis for the continued de-
ployment of American troops shifted to other justifications, most notably
the prevention of a Communist take-over in the country. The use of a
minimally coercive strategy of limited duration is thus a reliable in-
1 8 5 1bid.
dicator of the objectives sougtac by the intervening power. The longer
the troops remain after performance of the mission, the 'ore thei. pre-
sence will be perceived as intervention for impermissable, non-humani-
tarian purposes.
E. Outcomes
The most important outcome of any humanitarian intervention should,
of course, be the termination of affronts to human dignity. Conduct
which shocks the conscience of mankind must be arrested; human lives must
be preserved. Other outcomes include the short-term restoration of mini-
mum public order and the longer-term rehabilitation of the victims of op-
pression. Long-term rehabilitation is more appropriately a job for the
world community as a whole, not for any particular intervening state.
If an intervening state remained in military control of the affected
territory for a long period of time: this may sometimes be regarded as
unjustified interference in domestic affairs. The most significant ex-
ception to this general rule was, of course, the presence of the Allied
occupying troops in Germany and Japan after the Second World War to ef-
fect de-Nazification and demilitarization programs. These occupations
bad the support of the world community and were perceived a6 necessary
measures in the common interest to prevent possible future aggression.
In that sense they were truly international in scope.
If humanitarian arguments are advanced solely as a pretext to allow
an intervening state to pursue other goals, the outcomes of the inter-
vention will, of course, be quite different. Hitler's occupation of
the Sudetenland is a good example; the failure of appeasement at Munich
contributed to a pattern of aggression that eventually resulted in the
Second World War.
Different problems emerge when a humanitarian outcome is mixed with
outcomes of a different nature. For example, the creation of Bangladesh
resulted both in the termination of Pakistani brutality and in the crea-
tion of a wholly new balance of pc.'er on the Indian subcontinent. Under
ordinary circumstances Indian military operations designed to foster the
'dismemberment of the Pakistani state would be thwarted by the world com-
munity. Yet India's self-interest did not prevent the over-all operation
from being in the common interest involved in bringing to an end atroci-
ties which posed grave threats to international peace and security.
In the Dominican Republic case the internaticnal community approved
the iumanitarian outcome--the rescue of foreign nationals in grave dan-
ger--and vigorously criticized the non-humanitarian outcome--the instal-
lation of a government acceptable to the United States. The former out-
coer was perceived as consistent with the commcn interest, the latter
only in the special interest of the United States. Once again, the Do-
minican case is important because it indicates the limits the world com-
munity is likely to impose o,, the conduct of hunanitarian operations.
F. Effects
The long-term effects of humanitarian intervention may ultimately
prove more importanu than an individual outcome. Humanitarian inter-
vention, like any criminal sanction, has as its object not only the re-
mediation of currant and rfitediate violations of human rights, but also
the deterrence of future deprivations. The absence of an effective de-
terrent, conversely,'would lead to more serious violations, since ruling
elites would quickly discover that they could perpetrate atrocities with-
out protest or condemnation. Since widespread violations of human rights
are known to constitute threats to international peace, some sanctioning
process is essential if the likelihood of war is to be reduced.
Abuses of humanitarian intervention doctrine must also be deterred.
The long-term effect of the Dominican feeublic case has been to put the
United States and other would-be interYintng powers on notice of the li-
mits placed on humanitarian intervention unLder international law. Of
course, the sanctioning process in th;s instance is by no means perfect,
and it would be difficult to deter a major military power from undertaking
a sham humanitarian operation if it decided to pay the price of world ccn-
demnation. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is tragic testimony to
this point. Humanitarian intervention is not the only institution that
is vulnerable to this kind of abuse, however, and a flat prohibition of
humanitarian military operations would be equally unsuccessful ir deter-
ring a determined aggressor from his illegal goals. Nevertheless, it
would be wrong to underestimate the power of current international sanc-
tioning processes. Abuses of humanitarian intervention doctrinzs have
not been as prevalent as critics of humanitarian intervention would have
one believe.
In sum ary, a modern law of humanitarian intervention would serve
as an effective remedy to redress current violations of human rights and
would provide a credible deterrent to future deprivations. Abuses of hu-
manitarian intervention cannot be prevented in their entirety, but the
long-term effect of a modern doctiine of humanitarian intervention would
be to make abuse less likely because states would be sanctioned for their
failure to abide by limits on the conduct of humanitarian intercession
under international law.
